RECENT CASES.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
An agreement to accept less than the liquidated amount of a
debt in discharge thereof will operate as a good accord and
statt stttt satisfaction if actually executed by payment of
c zi
agreed amount. Phinzy v. Bush, 59 S. E. Rep.
259. Sup. Ct. of Ga. This decision is based upon
Riva of
loaesrV.
a Georgia statute, CiVil Code (1895), sec. 3735,
and is directly contra to the common law rule of
Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 6o 5 .
The following states have also abolished the common law
rule by statute:
Alabama-Ala. Code (1876), sec. 2774;
California-Civil Code (1894), sec. 1524;
Maine-Rev. St., Ch. 82 sec. 45;
North Carolina-Code, sec. 574;
North Dakota-Rev. Code, sec. 3827;
Oregon-Hills Amer. Laws, sec. 755;
South Dakota-Comp. Laws, sec. 3486;
Tennessee-Code (1884), sec. 4539;
Virginia-Code (I897), sec. 2858;
Mississippi abolished the rule by decisions without statute
-Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499. By decision, also, in some
states a parol debt may be satisfied if the creditor gives a
receipt in full for a partial payment-Green v. Langdon, 28
Mich. 221; Lemprey v. Lemprey, 29 Minn. i51; Gray v. Barton, 55 N. Y. 68; Ferry v. Stephens, 66 N. Y. 321.
AGENCY.
A lessee's agent with instructions to renew the lease of his
principal, renewed- it for himself at the old rental. He finally
assigned the lease to his principal, but the landFlureto
R..w Lea": lord refused to consent: This agent procured
T
of
others to try to obtain the lease for him. Due to
Fiduciary
Duty

their high offer, the principal was finally compelled

to pay an additional thousand dollars rental in

order to procure the lease for himself. Held, The agent was
(203)
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CONFLICT OF LAWS.
liable in tort for the loss sustained by the principal-See note,
page.
A, in Tennessee, sent a telegram to B, in Arkansas, to call B
to the funeral of a near relation. The telegram was lost in
transit before it reached the state of Arkansas. B
sued the telegraph company in Arkansas to
Telegraph
recover damages for "mental anguish." Held,
Failureto
Deliver
though he could not recover under the Arkansas
esage
statute, which gives a cause of action to the addressee when the negligence is shown to have occurred within
the state, yet he could recover under the decision of the courts
of Ternessee, which permit the addressee of a telegram to sue
on the contract of the sender, to recover for mental anguish.
Supreme Court of Arkansas, in W. U. T. Co. v. Woodward,
105 S. W., 578.
In determining what law governs, the ultimate criterion is
the intention of the parties, expressed or implied (II Wharton,
Conflict of Laws, 1o56, 3d ed.). When the addresse of a telegram recovers on the theory that the contract was made for
his benefit, it might be said that the parties must have intended
that the law of the place of delivery should apply. It was so
held in Howard v. Tel. Co., 84 S. W., 764 (Ky.); but on the
ground that the negligence occurred entirely in Keitucky. But
if the recovery is on the contract, it would seem that the
place where the negligent act occurred is of no importance in
determining what law shall apply. See Tel. Co. v. Cooper, 29
Tex. Civ. App., 591.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The State Legislature of Texas enacted that the Comptroller
of Public Accounts shall issue a permit to apply to the county
judge of the proper county for a liquor license;
Police
must show, among other things,
that the applicant
Reuation:
that he is a law-abiding, tax-paying, male
LiquorUcense (i)
citizen of the state of Texas, and (2) that he has been a resident of the county wherein such license is sought more than
two years next before the filing of such petition. A, a resident
of Arkansas, seeks a mandamus to compel B., the comptroller,
to issue to him such a permit, alleging that the above require-
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).
ments are unconstitutional under Art. 4, Sec. 2, and Art. 14,
Sec. i of the Federal Constitution. Held, (i) that the regulation of the liquor traffic is within the police powers of the
state with which the above sections were not designed to interfere, and (2) that this discrimination against non-residents was
not a mere guise for discrimination, or without good reason.
For it is reasonable that they should be residents of the county,
so as to be within the jurisdiction at all times for the enforcement of the law, and to enable the character of the applicant
to become known in case of impeachment if it be necessary. -De
Grazier v. Stephens, 105 S. W., 952.
A similar case arose in Missouri, in 1843, under Art. 4, Sec.
2, and was then held to be constitutional in Austin v. State, io
Mo., 591.
Liquor dealers, saloon-keepers, hawkers, peddlers, theaters,
shows, billiard-table keepers, gamblers, brewers, etc., are within
the class subject to such police power. Territory v. Connell,
i6 Pac. (Ariz.), 209. So, also, are laundries and professions.
Barbierv. Connolly, 113 Fed., 3. However, where such exercise of the police power works a discrimination against the
products of another. state, as in the "Dispensary Law" of
South Carolina, prohibiting a citizen from buying liquor in
another state for his own use in his own state, the act is unconstitutional. Donald v. Scott, 67 Fed., 857.
The statute providing such regulation may not give to the
person whose duty it is to enforce the act an unrestrained will
or discretion, but there must be fixed rules by which impartial
execution may be secured. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S.,
373.

By ordinance duly enacted under the legislative powers conferred by the legislature, B granted to A the street railway
franchise, upon certain conditions. A fulfilled the
conditions and put the line into operation at a cost
Of $75,ooo. Thereupon B proceeded to pass anRmh t
other ordinance, within its legislative power,
Passe
repealing the first ordinance. A brings a bill to
restrain the mayor and council from passing the "ordinance, on
the ground that it will impair the obligations of his contract
and deprive him of his property without due process of law.
Held, that though the ordinamce would be unconstitutional,
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equity cannot restrain its passage, because the act involves legislative discretion which is within the sovereign power and
protection of the legislative branch of the government. Missouri v. Olathe, 156 Fed., 624.

That equity cannot restrain the passage of an ordinance,
was similarly held in Alers v. City, 32 Fed., 503, or the fixing
of rates by a commission duly authorized, in McChord v. Railroad, 183 U. S. 483.
But where irreparable injhry would result, equity will restrain the passage of an ordinance if it is ultra vires (Spring
Valley, v. Bartlett, I6 Fed., 615), or if the statute authorizing
the passage is unconstitutional (Vicksburg Water Works v.
Vicksburg, 185 U. S., 67).

In Lawrence v. Rutland Railroad Company, 67 Atl. Rep.,
lo91 (Nov. 16, 1907), the Supreme Court of Vermont sustains

the validity of a Vermont statute which provides
that a mining, quarrying, manufacturing, mercaitile, telegraph, telephone, railroad, or other transportation corporation, and an incorporated express,
water, electric light or power company, transacting business in that state, shall pay its employees each week,
in lawful money, and prohibiting payment in store orders or
other script, forbidding assignments of future wages to such
company, or to anyone in its behalf, and prohibiting such a
company from exacting from its employees, as a condition of
employment, an agreement to accept wages at any other time;
and holds that under the reserve power to alter, amend or
repeal, the statute (i) is not a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; (2) that
it is not a denial of the equal protection of the laws, its classification being a reasonable one; (3) that its classification is
not void because it includes certain corporations improperly,
nor because it operates on foreign corporations as well as
domestic but that it is valid as to those properly included,
regardless of its effect upon those improperly included; and
(4) that it does not infringe the employee's right to contract,
the restriction not being direct, but resulting indirectly from
the restriction of the employer's right, the restriction being
valid as to the employer. See note, p.
Statte
Requiring
Payment of
Ro29
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CONTRACTS.
In consideration of one dollar in hand paid, B agreed in writing to convey to A certain interests in land upon the payment
of the agreed price within twelve months. Within
opuos
C..d.;ion the agreed time, B conveyed the said rights to C.
of One [,*UZ
A sues B and C for damages for the loss of the
contract, alleging conspiracy.
Held, the agreement was without sufficient consideration and
B, by the sale to C, withdrew the offer. Noble v. Mann, IO5

S. W. (Ky.),

152.

This decision is the result of the theories of mutuality'and
sufficient consideration prevailing, in Kentucky. This doctrine
of mutuality of obligation and liability is the old theory put
forth by Lord Redesdale in Lawrence v. Butler, i Schoales &
Lefroy, i9; and by Chancellor Kent in the dicta of Parkhurst
v. Cortland, i Johns. Ch., 282, and Benedict v. Lynch, Ibid, 37o.
England rejected the doctrine in Hatton v. Gray, 3 Ch. Cas.,
164. Kent repudiated it in Classon v. Bailey, 14 Johns. R.,
484. New Jersey adhered to it in Smith v. McVeigh, 3 Stockton, 239, but repudiated it in Hawralty v. Warren, I8 N. J.
Eq., i26. Kentucky adopted it upon the reasoning of Lord
Redesdale, in Baucher v. Vanbuskirk, 2 A. K. Marshall, 723,
and has adhered to it rather strictly down to the case of Bacon
v. Kentucky Railroad,95 Ky., 376.
To give this mutuality, Kentucky holds that the consideration for the option must be both good and sufficient. A consideration of one dollar is held not sufficient, even though
under seal. Thompson v. Reid, ioi S. W. (Ky.), 964.; Letz
v. Gosling, 93 Ky., i85. Nor will a sufficient consideration be
implied in a covenant of lease (Baucher v. Vanbuskirk, supra),
but must be found sufficient in fact. Bacon v. Kentucky Railroad, supra; Bank v. Baumeister, 87 Ky., ii.
These doctrines of consideration and mutuality are contra
to those generally held in all other jurisdictions, for .which see
Hawralty v. Warren, I8 N. J. Eq., 126, and Adams v. Peabody,
82 N. E. (Ill.), 645, and the cases therein cited.

DISCOVERY.
In a suit on an insurance policy which contained a clause
preventing recovery in event of death by suicide, it appeared
that the insured met his death by falling from the
eedLml
roof of his house. But the circumstances accompanying the accident were highly suspicious, pointing to a deliberate suicide. He had purchased morphine on
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DISCOVERY (Continued).
the day of his death and his eyes showed the effect of morphine poisoning. He had, however, been buried without any
examination having been made on the part of the insurance
companies. The court granted an order permitting the insurance company to exhume the body for examination. Mutual
Life Insurance. Co. of Neiv York v. Griess, 156 Fed., 398.
See note, page

FRAUD.
Defendant bank, after having been informed by the Comptroller of the Currency that certain of its assets were doubtful,
without any examination of said assets issued a
Liability for
Fae
prospectus containing them. After a great part
of the doubtful assets had been declared valueless
by the Comptroller, plaintiff, having, in reliance
upon the prospectus, purchased shares of the bank's stock,
brought the present action to recover the price paid for the
shares. Held, that this report'was put-out with the intent that
it should be published for the information of the public, and
for all who would have dealings with the bank and in its stock;
and being either actual recklessness of results, or a wilful
refusal to make the examination, the defendant was liable.
Taylor v. Thomas, lo6 N. Y. Sup., 538. It has been held that
where a corporation makes a false representation, for a purpose other than to induce anyone to buy shares, one who buys
shares on the faith of the representation has no action against
the corporation. Hunnewkll v'Duxbury, 154 Mass., 286.
Where the directors of a company issue a false prospectus
with the intent of inducing the public to buy shares, and one
relying on the prospectus buys shares from an original allottee,
he has no action against the directors, because there was no
intent that the plaintiff should act on it. Peek v. Gurney, L. R.,
6 H. L., 403. Since the report in the principal case was merely
to create a false impression in the business world in order to
avert the ruin of the bank, and not to induce the plaintiff to
buy shares, there would seem to be here a step in advance.
That it is. better to hold a man to a strict account for his
words and liable to whoever acts on them, whether intended
for him or not, is hardly questionable.
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JEOPARDY.
After a jury had been sworn and testimony given, a juror
was reminded of an occurrence in his father's family years
ago, which rendered him biased and unqualified to
What
render an impartial verdict. The jury was thereConstitutes
eingputfIn
upon discharged and another impaneled and
L 1MIaUmb sworn. The defendant set up his constitutional
right against being twice put in jeopardy for the
same offence. His plea was overruled. State v. Hansford, 92
Pac. Rep., 551 (Kansas).
There is a division of authority as to when jeopardy exists.
Some jurisdictions hold that one has never been placed in
jeopardy until a valid verdict has been returned. State v.
Elden, 41 Me., 165; People v. Meakim, 61 Hun, 327. The
weight of authority, both in numbers and reasoning, holds that
when a man is brought face to face with a full jury, duly
sworn, he is placed in jeopardy. United States v. Van Vleet,
23 Fed. Rep., 35; Alexander v. Comm., 1O5 Pa., I. The difficulty which arises from the latter position is exemplified in
cases like the present. Bishop (Crim. Law, Vol. I, Sec. 867869) reconciles them with the principle by saying that the
occurrence which interrupted the trial was certain, though unforeseen, at the time the jury was sworn; so that upon its
happening, the whole proceeding was vitiated and jeopardy
never existed,
PERPETUITIES.
Testator devised certain premises in equal parts to his two
sons, on the trust that the part devised to each should be held
for his benefit, without power of sale, for life,

sA
Sonof
Absolute

Power of

and he appointed his two sons trustees of the

property devised for their own use. Held, No
trustee having been appointed to hold the legal
title during the time the testator's sons should
have the beneficial interest, the effect of the devise was to vest
in testator's sons a life estate, and the attempt to deprive them
of the power of alienation was repugnant to the estate and
void. Street v. Fay, 82 N. E. Rep., 648 (Sup. Ct., Ill.).
In a devise of land in fee simple, a condition against alienation is void, because it is repugnant to the estate devised.
Potter v. Crouch, 141 U. S., 315; Keppele's Appeal, 53 Pa. St.,
211. There is some conflict in the decisions as to whether the
same rule applies to life estates. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S.,
Alienation:
Ufe state
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716. "But where an estate is made to vest without conditionany restriction on the power of alienation is repugnant to the
estate devised to the first taker, be it a life estate or a fee
simple." Bank v. Davis, 21 Pick., 42; Fleming v. Harrison,
76 Ky., 723. "No principle of public policy, or of stare decisis
establishes the rule that the testator may, without the intervention of a trustee, vest an estate in fee, or for life, with a
restriction thereon repugnant to an estate and preventing alienation of the same." Hendersdn v. Harness, 176 IUI., 302.

STREET RAILROADS.
The plaintiff saw an approaching car of the defendant as he
was about to cross the latter's tracks. He urged his horse forward, but owing to the excessive speed at which
Crosing
Track:
the defendant's car was traveling, a collision ocContributory
curred before he could clear the tracks. It was
Negligence
held that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence; nor was he bound to anticipate the unreasonable use of the highway by the defendant. Indianapolis St.
Ry. Co. v. Hoffman (Ind), 82 N. E. Rep., 543.
In Callahan v. Phila. Tract. Co., 184 Pa., 425, the principle
of the present case was followed, but by later decisions it has
in effect been overruled in Pennsylvania (Keenan v. Traction
Co., 202 Pa., 107), so that the doctrine of the latter state stands
in marked contrast with the principal case. In a case practically
similar to the one under discussion, binding instructions were
given for the defendant. Timler v. Transit Co., 214 Pa., 475.
This is a direct outgrowth of the Pennsylvania doctrine, which
has, by an unbroken line of decisions, held that non-compliance
with the injunctions of the "stop, look and listen" signs at
steam railway crossings is negligence, per se. Pa. R. R. v.
Beal, 73 Pa., 504. The application of this presumption of law
to street railways to the extent of holding it contributory negligence in not looking in both directions immediately before
crossing the track, seems to disregard the fundamental difference between the roadbed rights of the two carriers.
The principal case represents the general law on this question. CincinnatiSt. R. Co. v. Whitcomb, 66 Fed., 915; Weiser
v. Broaway St. R., io Ohio, 14.
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WILLS-LEGACIES.
A testator bequeathed pecuniary legacies to various persons,
but died intestate as to his realty. It was offered to show by
parol evidence that his personal property was
EId
PAEv
of lant to
insufficient to pay the legacies after satisfying his
a
' 0
debts, and that he intended to make such legacies
a charge on the realty. Held, the evidence was
inadmissible. Fries v. Osborne, 82 N. E. 716 (Ct. of App.,
N. Y.).
Parol evidence is not admissible to show the intention of the
testator as to the disposition of income of a specific legacy before
payment of the legacy, where the will is silent in regard thereto.
Loring v. Woodward, 41 N. H., 391; Goulder v. Chandler,87
Mo., 63. The intention of the testator cannot be gathered
wholly from facts dehors the will. Judy v. Williams, 2 Ind.,
449.

